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INDIAN RIGHTS TO LANDS UNDERLYING NAVIGABLE
WATERS: STATE JURISDICTION UNDER THE EQUAL
FOOTING DOCTRINE VS. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

I. INTRODUCTION
A substantial portion of the United States water reserves is
located adjacent to and included in Indian reservations. 1 Many
reservations were established near bodies of water because of
Indian dependence on water for transportation and food. 2 Since
water is such a valuable resource to the Indian and non-Indian
community alike, there has been considerable litigation and
analysis concerning tribal water rights. 3 However, comparatively
little attention 4 has been given to the rights of Indians in beds5 and
tidelands 6 of lakes7 and watercourses 8 which border or traverse
reservations.
Obviously, ownership in beds or tidelands can confer
significant economic, social, and political benefit. For example,
some underlying lands contain such valuable resources as oil and
gas. 9 Besides revenue from natural resources, the owner may be
entitled to revenue from dam projects located on the body of
water.' 0 The owner of the underlying land may be able to
determine whether there is access to the water for recreational and
I. Dellwo, Indian Water Rights - The Winters Doctrine Updated, 6 GONZ. L. REV. 215, 216(1971).
2. Water has always been a mainstay of the Indian economy, by providing a primary source of
food and supporting agriculture. 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REV. COMM'N FINAL REPORT 334-36
(1977).
3. Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546 (1963). See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564
(1908); United States v. Athanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.
S_ 988 (1957); United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
Numerous law review articles have been written on the subject of Indian water rights. E.g., Dellwo,
6 GoN7. L. REv., supra note 1; Veeder, Winters DoctrineRights, 26 MONT. L. REV. 149 (1965).
4. Although there are several significant cases involving Indian title to underlying lands, this
issue has only been dealt with briefly-in legal journals. See Note, Indian Claims in the Bed of Oklahoma
Watercourse, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 83 (1976); Dellwo, 6 GONZ. L. REV., supra note 1, at 234-35.
5. The bed of a body of water has been generally defined as that soil so usually covered by water
that it is wrested from vegetation. "It is the land upon which the waters have visibly asserted their
dominion ...." Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1906).
6. Tidelands are those lands alternately covered and uncovered by the rise and fall of the tide,
the land between high tide and low tide. BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1277 (3rd ed. 1969).
7. A lake is a "reasonably permanent body of water substantially at rest in a depression in the
surface of the earth." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS 5 842 (1939).
8.A watercourse is a "stream of water and its channel, both of natural origin, where the stream
flows constantly or recurrently on the surface of the earth in a reasonably definite channel." Id.
841(1).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 156 F.2d 769, 772 (10th Cir. 1946), cert.
granted, Oklahoma v. United States, 329 U. S. 711, aff'dper curiam, 331 U. S. 788 (1947).
10. See, e.g., Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 298 F.2d 335, 340 (D. C. Cir.
19621.
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commercial purposes, 1 in particular access for fishing. When
accretion, 12 avulsion, 13 or reliction 14 occurs, the ownership of the
newly uncovered land becomes a vital issue and may be decided on
the basis of title to the bed.15 Ownership of the bed and tidelands
can also have important judicial consequences by dictating whether
the federal, state, or tribal court has subject-matter jurisdiction
6
over a particular cause of action. '
With the ever-increasing recognition by Indian tribes of the
economic and social benefit to be gained through establishing title
to lands underlying waters and with the increasing legal
sophistication of the Indian community, litigation in this area of
Indian law will undoubtedly significantly increase and analysis of
the issues involved is relevant and necessary.
At the outset it is important to note that the issue of ownership
to lands underlying navigable waters concerns the clash between
state and tribal rights, two divergent doctrines as to ownership
having developed. On one hand there is the presumption that lands
underlying navigable 7 waters pass to the state upon its admission
into the Union because of the constitutional doctrine of equal
footing.' 8 This presumption was interpreted to require that
!1.See Dellwo, 6 GONz. L. REV.. supra note 1,at 234.
12. Accretion has been defined as "an addition to land coterminous with the water, which is
formed so slowly that its progress cannot be perceived. " Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U. S.
178, 193 (1890).
13. In contrast to accretion, avulsion is the process by which the river changes its course in an
impetuous and unpredictable manner. Omaha Indian Tribe, Treaty of 1854 v. Wilson, 575 F.2d
620. 634 (8th Cir. 1978). revd other grounds, Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribes. U'S. __
, 47
U.S. L.W. 4748 (U.S. 1979).
14. Refiction is an increase in land by a permanent withdrawal or retrocession of the lake, sea,
or river. Hammond v. Shepard, 186 Ill.
235, 242, 57 N.E.867, 868 (1900).
15. See, e.g.,
Omaha Indian Tribe, Treaty of 1854 v. Wilson, 575 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd
other.grounds, Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribes, _U.S.
, 47 U.S.L.W. 4748 (U.S.1979).
16. See. eg..United States v. Finch. 548 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated, per curam, 433"U. S.
676(1977).
17. There are three federal standards of navigability. The first of these is waters which give rise
t: federal jurisdiction becacise of the commerce clause. i.e., they are capable of use as an interstate
highway. These waters are called navigable waters of the United States. See United States v.
Appalachian Power Co.. 311 U. S. 377 (1940). There is also a federal standard of navigability arising
Ot of the acfiniraslity jirisdiction of the United States. See Lucky Lindv, Dragon v. United States. 76
F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1935). The federal standard which is relevant to this article is the federal title test,
that is. when the United States or the tribe is a parts' to the action andf when the land is being claimed
v t he state by virtue ofthe equal footing doctrine. navigability is a federal question to be determined
b\ the federal standard which is navigability in fact.Navigability in fact is defined as when the
.i:aterCOU'Se
is susceptible of being used in its natural or ordinary condition for trade or travel. esven
thoutg tie waters are not capable of use in navagation in interstate or foreign commerce. United
States %. Holt State Bank. 270 U. S. 49. 55-56 (1926). Navigability insome cases tav be a matter of
slate frilperty law. particultrlv \\lsen tie litigation involves a disputei)betweei two private parties
and tIe issue isthe \ esting of properly"rights subsequent to ststenod. Sec Shore \. Shell Petroleumt
Corp.. 55 F.2d 696 (D. Kansas 1931). qf'd, 60 F.2d 1 (10th Cir.). cert.
dented. U.S. 656 (1932). If the
United States or the Indian tribe is a parts in a lateri
suit which insolves the navigability of a
wvat'rcoure previously decided in the basis of state law. the principal state court decision is not
binding io the United States or tie tuibe,because the\- were not parties to the original suit and
navigabifity is nos\ a question of federal las\ since itinvolves a vesting prior to statehood. 156 F.2d at
774.
18. Shivelv \. Bowlbv. 152 U. S. 1.26-31 (1894).
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evidence of express or plain intent to the contrary be present in
order to overcome the presumption. 19 On the other hand, disposals
to Indians have historically been interpreted more liberally by the
courts because of the doctrines of tribal sovereignty and the
Federal-Indian trust relationship and the fact that disposals to
Indians /by treaty, statute, or executive order are often very
ambiguous, particularly as to the boundaries of the reservations.
Given the legal significance of this divergence in the law and the
growing economic interests at stake, it is of timely importance to
examine the issue of state versus tribal ownership of lands
underlying navigable waters.
The purposes of this note are as follows: first, to discuss the
development of and rationale for the presumption that lands
underlying navigable waters pass to the state upon its admission
into the Union; secondly, to analyze the important cases, with
special emphasis on Supreme Court cases, in which there has been
an issue of federal disposal of lands underlying navigable waters to
Indian tribes; and thirdly, in conclusion, to suggest, in light of the
doctrines of tribal sovereignty and the trust relationship, what
language and circumstances should be necessary in order for a
court to find a disposal of these lands to Indian tribes, and in
particular whether the presumption of state ownership should be
applicable.
THAT LANDS
II. THE SHIVELY PRESUMPTION
UNDERLYING NAVIGABLE WATERS PASS TO THE
STATE UNDER THE EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE.
Early in the history of the United States, the Supreme Court
established that states are entitled to lands below the high water
mark of navigable waters within their respective jurisdictions, and
that these lands could not be afterwards granted away by the
Congress of the United States. 20 This is in sharp contrast to the
general rule regarding non-navigable waters, that title to the bed
remains in the United States, unless the federal government has
21
conveyed it by treaty, statute, or patent.
19. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 55 (1926).
20. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 238, 251 (1845).
2 1. Generally, if there has been a grant by the United States of the ands bounded on the nonnavigable stream, and there is no intent shown to restrict the cnveyance

to the upland or to

specifically include the underlying land, the grant will be construed and given effect according to the
law of the state in which the land lies. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574, 594 (1922). In many
states, the common law rule prevails that a grant to the uplands of a non-navigable stream includes
the adjacent land to the middle of the lake or stream. See United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1, 27
(1935); Scott v. Lattig, 227 U. S. 229, 242 (1913).
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The presumption of state ownership to shores and beds of
navigable waters is based on the constitutiona 2 2 doctrine that states
admitted subsequent to the formation of the Union were admitted
on an equal footing with the original states. 23 While the equal
footing doctrine is not designed to wipe out the diversities in
economic stature between the states, 24 it has been interpreted to
require parity with regard to political standing and sovereignty.2 5
However, property rights and sovereignty are closely intertwined.
The original states of the Union, by virtue of the Revolution and
their sovereignty, succeeded to the English Crown's title and
dominion to land underlying navigable waters. 26 Thus, it was held
that "to deny to the States, admitted subsequent to the formation
of the Union, ownership of this property would deny them
admission on an equal footing with the original States, since the
original States did not grant these properties to the United States
but reserved them to themselves."

27

The theory behind this holding has been expressed well by
several Justices of the Supreme. Court. Justice Stone wrote,
"Dominion over navigable waters and property in the soil. . . are
so identified with the sovereign power of government that a
presumption against their separation from sovereignty must be
indulged ....

",28

Justice Curtis much earlier noted that, "[T]his

soil is held by the State, not only subject to, but in some sense in
trust for, the enjoyment of certainpublic rights. "29 In the same
vein Justice Bradley stated that the title to shore and lands under
tide water "is regarded as incidental to the sovereignty of the state.
22. The doctrine does not rest on any express provision -of the Constitution, but rather on the
interpretation given the Constitution by the Supreme Court that this country is a union of political
equals. Case v. Toftus, 39 F. 730, 732 (C.C.D. Oregon 1889). In addition, legislation regarding the
admission of a state into the Union often included an equal footing clause. E.g., United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 714 (1950).
23. 152 U. S. at 26.
24. 339 U. S. at 716.
25. "The true constitutional equality between the states only extends to the right of each, under
the constitution, to have and enjoy the same measure of local or self-government, and to be admitted
to an equal participation in the maintenance, administration, and conduct of the common or
national government." Case v. Toftus, 39 F. at 732.
26. Under the English common law, title to tide waters and lands below high water mark was in
the King because their natural and primary use was public in nature. This rule of law was also
applicable to the English claims under the right of discovery, with the minor addition that navigable
waters, as well as tide waters were. to be included. 152 U. S. at 14. While Indian tribes had
the right of occupancy, the absolute right of property and dominion belonged to the European
nations by virtue of discovery. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U. S. (8 Wheat.) 240, 253-54 (1823). After
the American Revolution, all the rights of the Crown succeeded to the states by virtue of their
sovereignty, subject to the rights surrendered to the national government. These rights of the states
included title and dominion to lands underlying navigable waters, subject to the right of the United
States under the commerce clause. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U. S. (16 Pet.) 234, 263 (1842).
27. United States v. Texas, 339 U. S. at 716.
28. United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. at 14.
29. Smith v. Maryland, 59 U. S. (18 How.) 71, 74 (1855).
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•., held in trust for the public purpose of navigation and fishery. "30

Some early courts expressed in dicta the view that as a result of
the equal footing doctrine, title in land below high water mark
could not be granted away by the United States before the
admission of the state into the Union. 3 However, the Court in
Shively v. Bowlby s2 established the principle that the United States
can dispose of lands underlying navigable waters, stating as
follows:
By the Constitution, as is now well settled, the
United States, having rightfully acquired the Territories,
and being the only government which can impose laws
upon them, have the entire dominion and sovereignty,
national and municipal, Federal and state, over all the
Territories, so long as they remain in territorial
condition....
We cannot doubt, therefore, that Congress has the
power to make grants of lands below high water mark of
navigable waters in any Territory of the United States,
whenever it becomes necessary to do so in order to
perform international obligations, or to effect the
improvement of such lands for the promotion and
convenience of commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States, or to carry out other public
purposes appropriate to the objects for which the United
3
States holds the Territory.

3

Having recognized this right of the federal government to
dispose of lands underlying navigable waters, the Court also
established a presumption against such disposal.3 4 It is significant

that the Shively Court was concerned with a dispute between two
individuals, one claiming title from the State of Oregon, the other
claiming by patent, from the United States. 35 Thus, the Court
voiced its concern that lands underlying navigable waters should
not be disposed "piecemeal to individuals.

..

, but shall be held as a

whole for the purpose of being ultimately administered and dealt
with for the public benefit by the State, after it shall become a
completely organized community. ,36
30. Hardin v.Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381 (1891).
31. Id. at 381: Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U. S. (3 How.) at 259.
32. 152 U. S. 1 (1893).
33. Id. at 48 (citations omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 9.
36. Id. at 50.
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This presumption of state title to submerged lands has been
reaffirmed in the Federal Submerged Land Act 37 which provides
that title to land beneath navigable water vests in the respective
state in which the land is located. 38 However, there are specific
exemptions from the act for underlying lands which were lawfully
conveyed by the United States to any person 39 or held by the
United States for the benefit of Indians. 4 0 This Act is merely a
the equal
confirmation of states' existing rights in the bed under
41
states.
the
for
rights
new
no
creating
footing doctrine,
If there has been no disposal by the federal government prior
to statehood, the state may use or dispose of the bed as it chooses, as
long as there is no substantial impairment of the public interest in
the water and subject to federal rights under the commerce
clause. 42 Thus state law may significantly vary as to what private
43
rights are granted in beds of navigable waters.
Outside the area of Indian law, there have only been a few
special instances in which the United States has disposed of lands
44
underlying navigable waters before a territory became a state.
These special instances have involved the United States
withdrawing the navigable water and the adjoining underlying land
for the "public purpose ' 45 of creating and establishing wildlife
refuges .46
Thus, the Shively presumption has almost exclusively been
applied to and interpreted in cases involving possible disposals to
Indian tribes.
37.43 U.S.C. § § 1301. 1303, 1311-1315 and accompanying notes (1976).
38. Id.. 1311 (a).
39. Id. 1301 (1).
40. Id § 1313 (b).
41. Bonelli-Cattle Co. v.Arizona. 414 U. S. 313, 324 (1973).
42. Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Illinois. 146 U. S. 387, 452-53 (1892). This is one of the rare cases in
which tle Court revoked the state grant to a private part', because the disposal by the state violated
the doctrine that the state holds the title to the tidelands in trust for the people of the state.
43. North Dakota law pros ides that unlcss a different intent is expressed in the grant, owners of
upland take to the edge of the low water mark. N. D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1978). Justice Teigen
noted that disposal of title by the state is always subject to the rights of the public in the waters. Perry
v. Erling. 132 N.W.2d 889. 902 (N. D. 1965) (Teigenj.j concurring).
44. State v. Placid Oil Co., 274 So.2d 402, 413 (La. Ct. of App. 1972). cert. denied, 419 U. S.
1110(1975).
45. 152 U. S. at 48.
46. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); United States v. Alaska, 423 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U. S. 967 (1970). 1 he atthor was unable to locate a case in which the court found
that there was disposal to "perform international obligations." 152 U. S. at 48. However, in at least
one case, the argument was made that there was a special grant in order to fulfil! the obligation of the
United States under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. The Court summarily rejected that argument
however. Mann v.Tocoma Land Co., 153 U. S. 273 (1894).
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III. CASE LAW
The case law in this area will be approached from a historical
perspective, with particular emphasis on the two most significant
Supreme Court cases, United States v. Holt State Bank 47 and Choctaw
Nation v. Oklahoma. 48
A. PRE-HOLT CASES
Within ten years of Shively the Ninth Circuit 49 on the basis of
Shively's doctrine that the United States can grant rights to
underlying lands, held that there had been a congressional disposal
of tidelands to an Indian settlement in Alaska.5 0 The court found it
persuasive that a congressional act establishing a civil government
explicitly prohibited disturbance of Indian use and possession and
that it was well known that the tidelands were essential for the
51
fishing needs of the Indians.
The two Supreme Court cases during this period also found
the fishing needs of the Indian community to be determinitive as to
whether there was a disposal. 52 The Court in Donnelly v. United
States53 expanded the rule of Shively, holding that the river bed can
54
be granted by executive order as well as by an act of Congress.
The Court construed the executive order 5 5 which extended the
reservation to include the Klamath River bed as well as the upland
by applying a "reasonable language" canon of construction,
noting the fishing needs of the reservation. However, this decision
is limited in its application because the Court did not specifically
56
base its holding on a finding that the stream was navigable in fact.
47. 270 U. S. 49 (1926).
48. 397 U. S. 620(1970).
49. Many of the cases to be discussed are in the Ninth Circuit because of the large number of
Indian reservations located in this area of the country.
50. Heckman v. Sutter, 119 F. 83 (9th Cir. 1902).
51. Id at 88. Section 8 of the Act of May 17, 1884, stated that "the Indians or other persons in
said district shall not be disturbed in the possession of any lands actually in their use or occupation or
now claimed by them." Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24.
52. Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U. S. 78 (1918); Donnelly v. United States,
228 U. S. 243 (1912).
53. 228 U.S. 243 (1912). The issue in Donnelly was the validity ofa conviction ofa white man for
the murder of an Indian on the Klamath River within the Hoopa Valley Reservation. Since the
murder had occurred on the river itself, there was a question whether the bed of the Klamath was
Indian country so as to establish federal jurisdiction. Id. at 255.
54. Id. at 258-59. Previously, a Washington district court held that title to shore lands was only
valid by virtue of a congressional act and was not valid by executive order. United States v. Ashton,
170 F. 509,517 (C.C.W.D. Wash. 1909), appealdisn'issed,Bird v. Ashton, 220U. S. 604(1911).
55. The Executive Order of October 16, 1891, extending the reservation "to include a tract of
country one mile in width on each side of the Klamath River." I KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS-LAws
,N
TREATIES815 (A.M.S. ed. 1971).
56. 228 U. S. at 264. The Court evades the more difficult equal footing doctrine question by
basing its decision on the United States holding title to the bed, theorizing that title to the bed had
been recognized by the state in its statute declaring the river to be non-navigable or that if the river
was in fact non-navigable, the United States automatically held title to the bed. Id.
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Six years later, the Court in Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United
States57 held that Congress had included submerged lands within a

reservation established on the Annette Islands in Alaska. 58 Since
Alaska was not a state in the Union, there was no confrontation
with state jurisdiction under the equal footing doctrine. Rather it
was a confrontation between the tribe and an economically
powerful private interest, the fishing industry. In holding that the
reservation included the submerged lands, the Court stated as
follows:
The reservation was not in the nature of a private grant,
but simply a setting apart.

.

.

of designated public

property for a recognized public purpose - that of safeguarding and advancing a dependent Indian people
dwelling within the United States....
.... The purpose of creating the reservation was to
encourage, assist, and protect the Indians in their effort.to
train themselves to habits of industry, become
self-sustaining and advance to the ways of civilized life...

.... The Indians could not sustain themselves from

the use of the upland alone. The use of the adjacent
fishing grounds was equally essential....

59

The language of the Act of March 3, 1891, which created the
reservation, merely stated that "the body of lands known as
Annette Islands . . .is hereby ...

set apart as a reservation for the

use of the Metlakahtla Indians. "60 The Court went beyond the
reasonable language canon of construction and applied the rule of
construction generally applicable to Indian treaties that treaties or
statutes with Indians should be liberally construed. Thus in the
light of the Indian fishing needs, the words of the Act were
6
construed to grant a disposal of the underlying lands. 1
Therefore, during this period, the decisions of the Court never
squarely faced the issue of state rights under the equal footing
doctrine as opposed to tribal rights to the submerged lands.
57. 248 U.S. 78 (1918). In this suit. the United States sought to enjoin fisheries from maintaining traps in the navigable waters of the Annette Islands of Alaska claiming that the adjacent
wrater and submerged lands were included in the reservation. Id. at 86.
58. Id.at 89.
59.ld. at88-89.
60. Act of'Nlarch 3. 1891. ch. 561. §15. 26 Stat. 1101.
61. 248 U. S. at 89.
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However, the Court generally laid the groundwork as to what
factors were to be considered in determining whether there had
been a disposal to the tribe. Economic dependence on the waters
and submerged lands was one of these factors. Other considerations
were whether there was evidence of congressional intent to establish
a sovereign, but dependent nation, and whether the language of
the grant lent itself to an interpretation that the grant included the
submerged lands by applying the reasonable language or liberal
construction rules of interpretation.
B.

UNITED STATES

v.

HOLT STATE BANK

At first glance, these factors, particularly the canons of treaty
construction, appear to be tossed aside when the Court in United
States v. Holt State Bank, 62 holding that there was no disposal of the
bed of Mud Lake 63 to the Red Lake Indian Reservation, expanded
the rule of Shively to require that "disposals by the United States
during the territorial period are not lightly to be inferred, and
intention was
should not be regarded as intended unless the
64
plain."
very
made
definitely declared or otherwise
An examination of the facts in Holt discloses, however, that
even if more liberal canons of treaty construction were applied, the
Court would not have found a disposal of the lake bed in this case.
Red Lake Indian Reservation is a unique situation. The tract that
became known as the Red Lake Indian Reservation was never
ceded by the Chippewas nor set apart by the United States in any
formal manner. The reservation was land that was occupied by the
Indians and came to be recognized as a reservation by the
65
government and ultimately by the court in Minnesota v. Hitchcock.
Thus, there was no express grant, either by treaty, statute, or
executive order from which a Court could infer that the reservation
included the lake bed. In addition, there was no evidence of intent
to set apart the land for the purpose of establishing a sovereign
nation, but rather evidence of acquiescence to Indian aboriginal
title. 66 Although not expressly discussed by the Court, there
appeared to be no evidence that Mud Lake and its bed were
62. 270 U. S. 49(1926).
63. The United States on behalf of the Chippewas sought to quiet title to the bed of Mud Lake
because the lake had been drained, uncovering lands which the United States sought to dispose of for
the benefit of the tribe. United States v. H oh State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 52 (1926).
64. Id.at 55.
65. 185 U. S. 373 (1902). The case is cited by the Court in Holt, and the unique history of the
Red Lake Indian Reservation is briefly summarized. 270 U. S. at 58.
66. 270 U. S. at 58.
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necessary for the sustenance of the tribe. 67 Thus the factors, which
previously had aided the Court in finding title in the Indian tribe
were conspicuously absent in this case. There was no evidence of
economic dependence on the lands. There was no evidence of
congressional intent because there was no specific grant either by
treaty, statute, or executive order.
Nevertheless, Holt could erect a barrier to Indian tribes
acquiring title to lands underlying navigable waters. Since it is the
first Supreme Court case which directly involved the clash between
state rights under the equal footing doctrine 68 and Indian rights in
beds of navigable waters, its requirement that disposals be express
or made very plain is significant. The Holt requirement is not new.
It had been adopted by the courts as a general guideline for
construing all grants by the sovereign to private individuals. The
rationale was that government lands are held for the public, so
that they should not be disposed of to individuals unless the
intention is made very clear, inferences to be drawn in favor of the
government. 6 9 It is significant that the Holt Court found this canon

of construction to be applicable to disposals to Indian tribes. It is
unclear why the Court found this application necessary in view of
the unusual circumstances of the Red Lake Reservation.
Subsequent cases have recognized, however, that this canon of
construction should not be strictly applied to federal disposals to
Indians in light of the trust relationship between the United States
and Indians.7 0
C. CASES BETWEEN HOLT AND CHOCTAW:

1926-1970

1. Supreme Court Case
The significant Supreme Court case of this period is Hynesv.
Grimes Packing Co. 71 in which the Court held that the Secretary of
Interior was authorized to include tidelands and navigable waters
within the Karluk Reservation, but was not authorized to prohibit
commercial fishing in the waters of the Karluk Reservation. 7 2
67. The Court's description of the lake in its natural condition and the fact that itwas drained
would seem to indicate that it was not a primary source of food and not very useful for commerce. Id.
at 56-57.
68. Minnesota was admitted into the Union in 1858. The last treaties with the Chippewas were
concluded in 1855. Id.at 55, 58.
69. Caldwell v.United States, 250 U. S. 14, 20 (1919).
70. Seegenerally I AMERICAN INMIAN PotLICy RE,'. COM.s'N FINAt REPORT 125-38 (1977) for a
good discussion of the federal trust responsibility. This topic will be specifically addressed later in this
article. Seetext accompanying notes 120-134 infra.

71. 337U. S.86 (1949).
72. Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co. 337 U. S. 86, 123. This case was instituted by the canning
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Whether the language of the Interior Department regulation
designating the reservation was explicit enough to include the
adjacent waters and tidelands was not at issue. 73 The question was
whether the Secretary of Interior had the authority to include
tidelands and navigable waters within the reservation by virtue of a
congressional statute 74 which authorized him to designate as a
reservation, lands under actual use or occupation or additional
"public lands" adjacent thereto. The Supreme Court interpreted
the term "public lands" to include tidelands and navigable waters,
even though a strict interpretation of that language, as one might
read Holt to require, could exclude both navigable waters and
tidelands. 75 The Court relied on the precedential value of Alaska
Pacific Fisheries,7 6 in particular its finding that the use of the fishing
grounds was essential to tribal livelihood. 77 The Court also noted
that since the United States retained ultimate title over the lands in
this reservation, the interpretation of "public lands" that is
applicable when there is a final disposition to an individual was not
78
relevant to this case.
Thus the Court recognized that standards of interpretation
must be distinguished depending on whether the grantee is a
private individual or an Indian tribe. On the basis of this case it can
be argued that Holt's requirement of express or plain intent is a
standard of interpretation only applicable to private grantees , not
Indian tribes, because the United States usually retains ultimate
title to reservation lands.
industry in Alaska to acquire an injunction to prevent enforcement of an Interior Regulation which
prohibited commercial fishing in the waters of the reservation except by natives and their licensees.
They eventually gained their injunction, not on the grounds that the tidelands and water were not in
the reservation, but because the White Act, 44 Stat. 252 specifically prohibited the granting of any
exclusive right of fishing. Id. at 92, 93, 116-20 (1948).
73. Id. at 92. The regulation included within the prohibited area of commercial fishing all waters
within 3.000 feet of the shore of the Karluk Reservation. 50 C.F.R. § 208.23 (Supp. 1946). There
was no contention that this language did not include the tidelands.
74. White Act § 2, 49Stat. 1250 (May 1, 1936); 337 U. S. at 91.
75. The district court, applying the strict rule of Holt, held that "public lands" did not include
tidelands and navigable waters because of the normal meaning of the word, because of cases which
stated that public lands does not include tidelands, and because the inclusion violated the White Act.
Hvnes v. Grimes Packing Co., 67 F.Supp. 43, 48-49 (D. Alaska 1946). The court of appeals
modified this somewhat by holding that public lands could include the navigable waters, in light of
Alaska Pacific Fisheries, but not the tidelands. The court of appeals placed little emphasis on Holt,
recognizing the rule of liberal construction of treaties and the fishing needs of the Indian community.
Like the district court, their primary reason for excluding the tidelands was to prevent giving a
monopoly to the Indians. Hynes v. Crimes Packing Co., 165 F.2d 323, 330-31 (9th Cir. 1947). "he
Supreme Court was able to prevent this monopoly without excluding tidelands and navigable waters
from the reservation. 337 U. S. 86 (1948).
76. 248 U. S. 48.
77. 337 U.S. at 114.
78. In the case of Mann v. Tacoma, 153 U.S. 273, 283 (1894), the Court held that a grant from
Congress to a private individual of "public lands" did not include tidelands. The rationale was the
Shively presumption against disposal of tidelands. The Hynes Court finds this interpretation of the
term "public lands" to be inapplicable to this disposition to an Indian tribe because unlike a grant to
the private individual, the disposition is not final. 337 U.S. at 115-16.
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2. Lower Court Cases
There are several important lower court cases which again
emphasized the fishing needs of the Indian community and found
tribal ownership of the submerged lands. In most of these cases,
Holt was distinguished or disregarded.
In United States v. Moore, " the Ninth Circuit held that the
reservation included the bed of the Quillayute River. The treaty
did not specifically include the river, but provided that a
reservation should be established sufficient for their needs.8 0 The
factors considered by the court were the doctrines of tribal
sovereignty and the federal government's trust responsibility, the
rules of treaty construction, and the importance of fishing to assure
their sovereignty. Holt was distinguished on the grounds that there
was no evidence in that case of the necessity of the waters for an
established fishing industry. 8 '
A later decision of the Ninth Circuit, however, denied disposal
of the tidelands of the Hood Canal to the Skokomish tribe in
Washington. 2 While the court recognized the canons of Indian
treaty construction, it added that Indian treaties should not be read
beyond their clear meaning in order to correct past injustices.8 3 The
court held that the lower court findings of fact were not clearly
erroneous and there was no disposal. 8 4 The lower court had
determined that the treaty and an executive order did not include
the tidelands within the exterior boundaries of the reservation8 5 and
that the evidence failed to establish Indian dependence on the
waters. There was substantial evidence showing that the
reservation was not intended to support these Indians. Unlike
denied. 330 U. S.827 (1947).
79. 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1946). cert.
80. Treat y with Quiillayutc Indians ofJuly 1. 1855, 12 Stat. 971.
81. United States v. Moore. 157 F.2d 760. 765 (9th Cir. 1946). cert.
denied. 330 U. S. 827 (1947).
This case is also significant in two other respects. It overturnts a prior decision of thle Ninth Circuit
which had ield that there was no disposition of the bed to the Indians because there was an express
grant to the state before tile establishment oftihe reservation. Taylor \. United States. 44 F.2d 531
(9th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 820 (1931). The Taoir court, interestingly enough, recognized
bodies. but that because there was an
that the title
to tie bed involved a confiontation oftwo politicat
express grant to the state prior to the resersation, the state possessed title. The Aoore court rejected
Taylor as precedent because of an error in its fiact-deter
iination. The Enabling Act and the
admission of the state into tle"Union occurred after the creation of the reservation. 157 F.2d at 764.
Moore is also significant in its determination that allotment is irrelevant to the determination of
whether a disposal of the underlying land occurred. Id.
82. Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 320 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1963).
83. Id. at 207-8.
84. Id. at 210.
85. Neither the treaty nor the executive order described the tidelands in issue. The treaty
reserved six sections of land "to be situated at the head of Hood's Canal." Treaty between United
States and S'Kallams Indians, january 26. 1855, 12 Stat. 933. The Executive Order of February 25.
1874, described the boundary of the reservation as "Beginning at the mouth ofthe Skokomish River:
thence up said river. ..; thence east to Hood's Canal: then southerly and easterly along said Hood's
Canal to the place ofbeginning." I KAPPLER, supro.note 55. at 924.
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many other tribes, these Indians were not confined to the
86
reservation; they were free to roam and hunt.
Two other cases deserve brief mention. A district court in
Washington found that tidelands were included in the Lummi
Reservation, distinguishing Holt on the basis of the fishing needs of
the Lummi Indians and language in the treaty specifically
extending the reservation to low tidelands on one boundary and
specifically including the river on the other. 87
In Montana Power Co. v. Rochester, 88 a grantee from an Indian
allottee claimed title to the tidelands so as to be entitled to damages
from a dam project. Because of the need to safeguard the tribe as an
89
entity, the court held that allotment, at least to an Indian allottee,
did not extinguish tribal title, title being retained by the United
States in trust for the tribe. 90 The court summarily held that the
Flathead Reservation included the lakebed of Flathead Lake,
because the reservation clearly included within its metes and
bounds the southern half of the lake, and even if the description
were less clear, rules of Indian treaty construction would require
91
the bed to be included.
Thus the cases in the period of 1926-1970 placed little
emphasis on Holt and reaffirmed the doctrines of tribal sovereignty,
the trust relationship, and liberal treaty construction, taking into
account the circumstances surrounding the grant.
D.

CHOCTAW NATION V. OKLAHOMA

These principles were soundly reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma92 in which the Court held that
treaty grants and patents had conveyed the bed of the navagable
Arkansas River to the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw Nations
where the river was entirely within the boundaries of the grant was
well as where the river formed the boundary line between the
reservations.9 3 The Court reached this conclusion by examining the
86. 32 F.2d at 212. Thus the Court is able to distinguish this case from Alaska PacificFisheries.
87. United States v. Stotts, 49 F.2d 619 (W.D. Wash. 1930). The court also noted that the tribe
retains title to the bed even though some of the adjacent land was allotted to individual members.
88. 127 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1942). This decision was recently followed by a district court in
United States v. Pollman, 364 F.Supp. 995 (D. Mont. 1973).
89. Montana Power Co. v. Rochester, 127 F.2d 189, 192 (9th Cir. 1942).
90. The Tenth Circuit held that when land adjacent to a non-navigable river bed is allotted to
individual members, the tribe loses title to the river bed adjacent to the allotted land. As to the
unallotted land, the tribe retains title to the river bed. Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. Seay, 235
F.2d 30 (10th Cir.), cerl. denied, 352 U. S. 917 (1956).
91. 127 F.2d at 190-91, 191 n.4.
92. 397 U. S. 620 (1970).
93. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S. 620, 631 (1970). The Court did not resolve the
dispute as to title between the petitioners. Id. at 630 n.7.
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circumstances and language of the grant 9 4 and applying the canons
of construction that treaties must be interpreted as the Indians
understood them with doubtful expressions to be resolved in favor
95
of the weaker party.

The Court found significant a history of removal and broken
treaties, 96 promises by the United States of permanent land in fee
simple, "never to be embraced in any Territory or State," 97 and
express treaty language describing the boundary as "up the
Arkansas,'' "down the Arkansas" and the "main channel." 98 The
fishing needs of the tribe was not determinative.
The Court cited9 9 with approval the holding of Brewer Elliot Oil
& Gas Co. v. United States100 in which the Court held that the "main
channel" language of the treaty granted Osage title to the bed of a
nonnavigable portion of the Arkansas. The Choctaw Court
commented that the "United States can dispose of lands underlying
navigable waters just as it can dispose of other public lands." 10 1
In reference to the expansion of the Shively presumption in Holt
that "disposals by the United States are not lightly to be inferred
and should not be regarded as intended unless the intention was
definitely declared or otherwise made very plain,'" 10 2 the Court
declared:
However, nothing in the Holt State Bank case or in the
policy underlying its rule of construction... requires that
courts blind themselves to the circumstances of the grant
in determining the intent of the grantor. Indeed, the
Court in Holt State Bank itself examined the circumstances
in detail and concluded "the reservation was not intended
to effect such a disposal." 270 U. S., at 58.... 103
94. Id. at 622-31.
95. Id. at 630-31.

96. Du ring the Revolutionary War period, both the Choctaws and Cherokees occupied much of
the southern and southeastern portions of the United States. In 1785 and 1786, the United States
eIitered into treaties with both nations to establish boundaries and assure peace and friendship. In
the tiillis ing y ears there were additional treaties by which the United States purchased land and
Indians continued to live on land not ceded. The' wsere not con'sidered to owntee title, but had right
t exclusive use and occupancy. Atter the Louisiana purchase, both nations agreed to trade part of
heir liands for lands in Arkansas. But because these w,ere already settled by whites, they agreed to
ccdc part ofthesc lands and tiove further wN
est. Id. at 622-26.
97. 397 U.S. at 625 (quoting Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, 7 Stat. 333 (1830) ); see 397 U.S.
at 626 (citing Treaty of New Echota. 7 Stat. 478 (1835)).
98. 397 U. S. at 631.
99. :397 U. S. at 632-33.
100. 260 U. S. 77 (1922).
101. 397 U. S. at 633.
102. United States v. Hot State Bank. 270 U. S. at 55.
103. 397 U. S. at 634.
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Sensing a significant erosion of the Shively-Holt rule in the
majority decision, the dissent reiterated the principles of Shively and
Holt of a strong presumption against disposal 10 4 and then, applying
this principle, argued that there was no disposal. Their reasoning
was that the conveyance did not specifically include the upland and
navigable waters should remain in the public domain.'0
Furthermore, the dissent stated that there was no evidence of
Indian use or desire for the bed during treaty negotiations and that
if title did exist it was extinguished by allotment. 106
On remand an Oklahoma court held that the tribes took title to
the middle of the channel because the cessions were in fact to
independent political bodies and the normal boundary with regard
to state boundaries was the mid-channel of a navigable stream. 0 7
The Supreme Court, while not resolving the dispute between the
tribes, implied this result when it noted that the middle of the main
channel is the normal boundary between states.' 0 Since identical
language was used here as that which normally designates state
boundaries, and since "Choctaw and Cherokee Nations.

.

. had

long been considered sovereign entities," the middle of the channel
was probably intended, especially in light of the rules of Indian
treaty construction. 10 9 By analogizing tribal government to states,
and reaffirming the principles of Indian treaty canon construction,
the Chataw Court had significantly undercut the doctrine of Holt,
and to some extent the Shively presumption against disposal, when a
conveyance to Indian tribes is involved.
E.

POST-CHACTAW CASES

Choctaw is the last case in which the Supreme Court has
specifically ruled on the issue of the disposal of land underlying
navigable waters to Indian tribes. United States v. Finch' 0 is the most
recent case which directly involved tribal ownership of land
104. Id at 645-48.
105. Id. at 652-53.
106. Id. at 653-54.
107. Choctaw Nation v. Cherokee Nation, 393 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Okla. 1975). This policy of
mid-channel boundaries between states is articulated in Wisconsin %'.Michigan, 295 U. S. 455
(1935).
108. 397 U. S. at 631-32, n.8.
109. Id. It is significant that the Court quotes an analogy drawn by an early Iowa court and
recognized by the Supreme Court in Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 337 (1877):
The grant to the [Indiansl was to them as persons, and not as a political body. The
politicaljurisdiction remained in the United States. Had the grant been to them as a
political society, it would have been a question of boundary between nations or states,
and then the line would have been the medium filum aquaeas it is now between Iowa and
Illinois.
397 U.S. at 631-32, n.8 (quoting Haight v. City of Keokuk, 4 Iowa 199, 213 (185b).
110. 548 F.2d 822

(9TH

CR.

1976), vacated per curiam, 433 U.S. 676 (1977).
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underlying navigable waters, although a recent Supreme Court
decision indirectly dealt with the issue. I" '
Finch involved the issue of whether the bank of the Big Horn
was within the boundaries of the Crow Reservation for purposes of
establishing jurisdiction for the violation of a tribal ordinance. The
district court had held that the bank was not Indian land. 1 2 On
government appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that there was a
disposal of the bed, but the Supreme Court vacated the judgment
on the grounds that the government appeal was barred by the
1 13
double jeopardy clause.
In finding a disposal of the bank to the Crows, the Circuit
Court utilized the same method of analysis as the Choctaw Court,
examining the circumstances surrounding the treaties, the
language of the treaties, and applying the rules of Indian treaty
construction.11 4 The Holt case is described, but not directly
distinguished, except by mentioning that the Choctaw Court had
5
found Holt to be inapplicable. 11
The purpose of the treaties, as discussed by the court, was to
define the tribal boundaries to help prevent white encroachment
and inter-tribal warfare."16 While the .language of the treaties
differed from Choctaw in that there was no fee simple grant and no
explicit clause protecting the tribe from state encroachment, the
Crows had the advantage that the Big Horn River was clearly
111. Omaha Indian Tribe, Treaty of 1854 v. Wilson, 575 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribes, __
U.S. __,
47 U.S.L.W. 4748 (U.S. 1979), is an interesting
case which involved a dispute over whether the boundary of the reservation remained the same after
significant changes in the location of the Missouri River. The boundary depended on whether
accretion or avulsion of the river had occurred.
The Eighth Circuit and Supreme Court agreed that the reservation originally included the
territory in dispute, as riparian lands granted by treaty, and that the non-Indian carried the burden
of proofand persuasion to overcome this presumption of Indian title. However, the courts disagreed
as to whether federal or state law determined whether the changes in the river were accretive or
evulsive. The Eighth Circuit held that federal law governed because of the federal Indian trust
relationship. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that state law was determinative. Its reasoning
was that no state border was involved, that no need for a federal uniform law existed and that the
equitable application of state law would keep the federal trust responsibility and Indian possessory
interests intact.
112. United States v. Finch, 395 F. Supp. 205 (D. Mont. 1975).
113. United States v. Finch, 433 U. S. 676 (1977). In a per curiam decision, the Court found a
violation of the double jeopardy clause because jeopardy had attached and there had been no formal
finding of guilt upon which the appellate court could predicate a conviction. The Court noted that
the lower courts had differed as to whether the bed was included in the reservation, but offered no
opinion as to the validity ofthese findings of fact. Id at 677.
114. 548 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1976).
115. Id. at 828-29.
116. Id. at 829. By the Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1851, 11 Stat. 749, 8 tribes including the
Crows covenanted to recognize specified boundaries between the tribes. There was no express grant
of land from the United States, although the United States did promise to protect the Indian people
and was allowed to establish roads and military posts on the reservation. During the negotiation of
this treaty, the government used such language as "your land" when dealing with the tribes. 548
F.2d at 830. This language was also used during the negotiation of the Treaty with the Crows of
1868, 15 Stat. 649, in which the national government set apart the lands for the "absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians." 548 F.2d at 829-3 1.
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situated within the metes and bounds of the reservation, instead of
constituting a boundary.' 1 7 As in Choctaw, there was no evidence of
fishing as an important means of livelihood. But this did not
prevent the court from finding a disposal to the Indians. The court
recognized that the water was important to the Indians to help
reorient their life away from big game and toward such pursuits as
agriculture and fishing. 118
Finch is an important extension of Choctaw, because Choctaw
could be read to be limited to those few tribes which had been
granted land in fee simple or which had been assured of protection
from state encroachment. The case is also significant because it
explicitly rejects the inference that could be drawn from most cases
that fishing as the center of Indian livelihood is essential to establish
tribal ownership. The important factors after Finch, at least in the
Ninth Circuit, are whether the treaty can be construed to include
the navigable waters within its boundaries and where there is
evidence of intent to recognize the tribe as a sovereign body. 1 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The forgoing analysis indicates a strong conviction by most
courts that tribal ownership to lands underlying navigable waters
should be evaluated in terms of long-established Indian law
doctrines, rather than the presumption and rules of construction
governing private grants from the national government. Although
no courts have explicitly stated that the Shively presumption and its
expansion in Holt is not applicable to tribal ownership of
submerged lands, many courts have in fact implied this by diluting
and counterbalancing the requirement of Shively and Holt with the
doctrines of the federal Indian trust relationship and tribal
sovereignty.
A.

THE FEDERAL TRUST RELATIONSHIP

The federal trust relationship is a prevasive doctrine which
117. Id. at 831.
118. Id. at 831-32. The appellee cited several Ninth Circuit cases which had found the fishing
needs of the Indians to be a crucial factor. Id. at 831 ri.
16.
119. The Court stated as follows:
We thus conclude that the United States by signing the treaty of 1868 with the Crows,
intended to grant them dominion and controlover that portion of the bed of the Big Horn
River situated within the reservation, subject to the retained power of the United
States to exercise its paramount right to control navigation in the river.
Id. at 831 (footnote omitted) (emphasis original).
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developed early in Indian law120 which established that the
relationship between the United States and Indians is unique
because of the special dependent status of Indian nations. There are
two components of this doctrine which are useful for purposes of
this discussion: the canons of Indian treaty construction and Indian
trust title to land.
1. Indian Treaty Construction
There are three important canons of Indian treaty
1) Ambiguous expressions in treaties must be
construction:'
resolved in favor of the Indians; 122 2) treaties must be interpreted as
the Indians themselves have foreseen and understood them;1 23 and
1 24
3) trealies must be liberally construed in favor of the Indians.
These rules developed because of a recognition of the brutal and
inequitable relations with Indians, along with serious language
problems during treaty negotiations. 25 The Court in Jones v.
A4eek t 2 1 sunmarized as follows:
In construing any treaty between the United States
and an Indian tribe, it must always. . . be borne in mind
that the negotiations for the treaty are conducted, on the
)art of the United States, an enlightened and powerful
nation, by representatives skilled in diplomacy, matters
of a written language, understanding the modes and
forms of creating the various technical estates know to
their law, and assisted by an interpreter employed by
themselves; that the treaty is drawn up by them and in
their own language; that the Indians, on the other hand,
are a weak and dependent people, who have no written
language and are wholly unfamiliar with all the forms of
legal expression, and whose only knowledge of the terms
in which the treaty is framed is that imparted to them by
the interpreter employed by the United States; and that
the treaty must therefore be construed, not according to
the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but
120. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. 30 U. S. (50 Pet.) 1 (1831).
121. These rules apply not only to treaties, but also agrCC nCnts. cxecutive orders, and statutes.
I AMERICAN INDIAN PoItic:Y RE,' COMM'N FINAl. REPORT at 109 (1977).

122. McClanahanv. Arizona State Tax Conm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174(1973).
123. Choctaw v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S. at 631.
124. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U. S. 423, 431-32 (1943).
125. 1. AMERICAN INDIAN PotIic, RE,. COMIM'N FINAl REPORTat 109 (1977).

126. 175 U. S. I(1899).
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in the sense in which they would naturally be understood
1..
127
by the Indians .
Thus cases involving treaty construction require an analysis of the
circumstances surrounding the grant.
The vast majority of cases in the area of tribal ownership of
navigable beds have recognized and applied these canons of
construction, the notable exception being Holt. However, as the
.Court in Choctaw recognized, even Holt surreptiously applied these
principles by noting the circumstances surrounding the
establishment of the reservation. 128 And in fact, had the Holt Court
applied these canons of construction, there still was no evidence of
any intent to dispose of these lands to the Red Lake Indian
Reservation. If it can be assumed that the courts will continue to
apply these rules of construction, 1 29 it can safely be surmised that
Holt's requirement of an express or plain intention is not applicable
to tribal ownership. However, merely applying these canons of
construction does not overcome the general presumption against
disposal expressed in Shively. 130
2. Indian Trust Title to Land
Except when Indian tribes have been granted land in fee
simple or individual Indians have gained title through the process
of allotment, a tribe merely holds beneficial title to its land. Legal
title is vested in the United States as trustee for the benefit of the
tribe. As the Court in Hynes v. Grimes Packing131 indicated, the
implication of this doctrine is that the rules regarding grants from
the sovereign should not be applicable, since the sovereign still
retains ultimate control over the land. The federal government can
at any time revoke the grant of the navigable lands or can by statute
or regulation assure that the public right in the bed is protected. As
the reader will recall, the main rationale for the presumption of
Shively was to assure that the public right in the navigable waters
127.,Jones v. Meek, 175 U. S. 1, 10-11 (1899) (citations omitted).
128. 397 U. S. at 634.
129. Even though the Supreme Court in its recent decisions continues to refer to the canons of
Indian treaty construction, an argument can be made that the Supreme Court is no longer, in fact,
applying these canons to the cases before them. One could point to the cases of DeCoteau v. District
County Court, 420 U S. 425 (1975) and Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) in
which the Court found that the reservations, respectively, had been terminated and disminished,
although there was no express congressional language to that effect. The Court in DeCoteau noted that
while treaties are to be construed in favor of the Indians, "[a] canon of construction is not a license to
disregard clear expressions of tribal and Congressional intent." 420 U.S. at 447
130. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. at 1.
131. 337 U. S. 86(1949).
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and submerged lands is protected and that the bed is not distributed
piecemeal to individuals.13 2 Even if the reservation land is allotted,
the Indian allottee does not gain private title to the bed of the
navigable water; the title is retained by the United States in trust
for the tribe. 31 3 It is also interesting to note that if the submerged
land has passed to the state, the state subject to the public trust
doctrine, has the right to convey the bed as it chooses, including the
34
power to grant it to private individuals. 1
Thus, even if the tribe can be described as a private
individual, a disposal to the tribe is not clearly different than a
disposal to ihe state. In both cases the land may ultimately be
occupied by private individuals, but the interest of the community
is still protected, at least to a limited extent. However, the tribe is
more than an individual. t is a sovereign political body.
B.

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

135

The doctrine of tribal sovereignty developed very early in the
history of the United States in the decision of Worcester v. Georgia,136
in which Chief Justice Marshall stated that Indian tribes are
"distinct,

independent,

political communities. '1

37

However,

a

year before, this statement was limited by the doctrine that Indian
38
tribes are always subject to the power of the federal government. 1
Being both independent of the state and dependent on the
federal government, the tribe is faced with the paradox of having
less sovereignty than a state because the federal government has
complete control over the tribal government, 139 but at the same
time being protected in most cases from the intrusion of state
jurisdiction, while also being a part of the state geographically.
152 U. S. at 49. 50.
133. Montana Power Co. v. Rochester. 127 F.2d 189. 192 (9th Cir. 1942).
134. Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Illinois. 146 U. S.387. 435-37. 465. 474 (1892).
135. See generally,
F. CoHEN. HANDBOOK OF FEERAL INDIAN LAW 122-50 (Univ. N. Mex. ed.
197i): \Ve rhan, The Sovrei ,n'r of Indian Tribes. A Reaffirmation and Strengthening in the 70's, 54 NOTRE
J
l)\.\t E L. R E .-. 5 (19 78).

1:32.

136. 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). This case involved an attempt by Georgia to abolish the
(her)kee government. The Supreme Court held that Georgia's laws could not operate against the
Cherokee tribe.
137. \Vorcester v. Georgia, 31 U..S. (6 Pet.) 350. 379 (1832).
138. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), Justice Marshall called the
Cherokees a -domestic dependent nation." Id. at 12.
139. The United States can establish federal criminal jurisdiction on the reservation. United
States v. Kagaia. 118 U. S. 375 (1886): the United States can als6 unilaterally abrogate treaties.
Lone \tVolfv. Hitchcock. 187 U. S. 553 (1903).
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This paradox is the source of many of the disputes in Indian law, 1 40
particularly the disputes between the tribe and the state. 141
The dispute over title to lands underlying navigable waters is
essentially a reflection of this power struggle between the state and
the tribal government for jurisdiction over land. If the navigable
water is clearly within the boundaries of the reservation, it seems
natural that the tribe should hold title to the bed, since it has
jurisdiction over waters located within the reservation. 1 42 The more
difficult question arises when the navigable waters constitute a
boundary of the reservation, i.e., whether the title cgoes to the
opposite shore so as to include the entire bed, whether it goes to
mid-channel as state boundaries normally do, whether it goes to the
low water mark, as grants to private individuals do.
The state's argument is that the Shively presumption should be
applied, that title generally only goes to the low water mark,
because the tribe, like an individual, does not protect the public
interest in the navigable waters or its underlying land. The tribe
merely protects its own interest. 143 On the other hand, while tribal
sovereignty over navigable water and lands is not public because
non-Indians may be excluded, its control is public in the sense of
being governed for the benefit of the tribe as opposed to the benefit
of an individual party. It is important to remember that the Shively
presumption arose in the context of a dispute between individuals,
the purpose of the presumption being to prevent a piecemeal
disposal to individuals. 144 A tribe cannot dispose of the bed
piecemeal and will in fact govern it to assure that the tribal interest
is protected, especially since ultimate federal control is always
present. 145
The Choctaw case in its analogy of the water boundaries of
tribes and states 46 additionally lends support to this position that a
grant to a tribe should at least be treated as a grant to a state, as
long as there has been some recognition of the sovereignty of the
tribe. Thus, if the grant indicates the navigable water as a
boundary, the grant should at least go to mid-channel and possibly
140. E ., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376 (1896) (whether the fifth amendrnent is applicable to
tribal iovernments and courts): United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313 (1978) (whether a tribal
conviction could give rise to double jeopardy).
141. E.g., McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Warren Trading Post
Co. v. Arizona Tax Cornm'n, 380 U.S. 685(1965); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217(1959).
142. Seegenera//y United States v. Finch, 548 F. 2d 822, 831 (1976).
143. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S. 620, 652-53 (1970) (White,J, dissenting).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
145. Seesupra text accompanying note 78.
146. See supra text accompanying and note 109.
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further if the circumstances and language of the grant indicate
special tribal needs for the entire bed.
Thus, since the tribe is a sovereign body, the presumption of
Shively should not be-applicable at all. Courts should recognize the
sovereign nature of the tribe and construe the grant in light of the
trust relationship. The language of the grant should be interpreted
to convey at least as much underlying land to Indians as when a
state is the grantee. The Indian need for land and water resources
to insure tribal sovereignty and self-sufficiency should also be taken
into consideration when defining reservation boundaries. Finally,
the obligation of the federal government to act as trustee and
guardian for Indian tribes should give rise to a presumption of
Indian title to underlying lands, which can only be overcome by
express or plain intent to the contrary.
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